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377 
HOW TERROR CHANGED JUSTICE: A 
CALL TO REFORM SAFEGUARDS THAT 




“Every victory in the courtroom brings us closer to our ultimate 
goal of victory in the war on terrorism. The Department of Justice 
will continue its aggressive battle in the courts to ensure the safety 
and security of all Americans.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
As Justice Sutherland stated in Berger v. United States, the 
prosecutor “is a representative not of an ordinary party to a 
controversy, but of a sovereignty . . . whose interest, therefore, in a 
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice 
shall be done.”2 As a representative of the government with the 
objective of doing “justice,” a prosecutor has the ability to wield 
the full resources of government to seek search warrants and 
wiretaps, to pursue indictments, and to grant immunity from 
                                                          
 * Brooklyn Law School Class of 2006; B.A. Brown University, 1999. The 
author wishes to thank her family and friends for their steadfast support and 
guidance. Many thanks to the staff of the Journal of Law & Policy for their 
dedication and insight. 
1 Press Release, U.S. Att’y Gen., Statement of Att’y Gen. John Ashcroft on 
Detroit Terror Case (June 3, 2003) [hereinafter Ashcroft on Detroit Terror 
Case], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/ 2003/June/03_ag_331.htm. 
2 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (reversing a conspiracy conviction because proof 
against the defendant was weak and prosecutor engaged in misconduct by 
misrepresenting facts and making improper insinuations during trial, thus 
prejudicing the defense). 
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prosecution.3 United States Attorneys, working under the 
Department of Justice, are responsible for prosecuting all offenses 
against the United States, defending the United States in all civil 
actions, and collecting debts owed to the federal government.4 
United States Attorneys investigate and prosecute criminal 
activities such as violent crime, drug trafficking, public corruption, 
and domestic and international terrorism.5 
Since September 11, 2001, the war on terror has been the 
Department of Justice’s (DOJ) first priority.6 Assistant U.S. 
Attorneys (AUSAs) are largely responsible for the investigation, 
indictment, and prosecution of terror suspects.7 An AUSA may use 
a wide variety of traditional investigative tools to help construct a 
case.8 After September 11th, the Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act (PATRIOT Act) greatly broadened the 
powers of federal law enforcement officials.9 The DOJ has shown, 
                                                          
3 Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1573, 1576 (2003). 
4 28 U.S.C. § 547 (2004). 
5 U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., U.S. ATTORNEYS: PERFORMANCE-BASED 
INITIATIVES ARE EVOLVING 2 (2004) [hereinafter Initiatives Report], available 
at http://www.gao.gov/new/items/d04422.pdf. 
6 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT FROM THE FIELD: THE USA PATRIOT 
ACT AT WORK 3 (July 2004) [hereinafter PATRIOT Act at Work], available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/patriot0704.pdf (quoting Attorney General 
John Ashcroft who stated in a speech given on Oct. 25, 2001, “[t]he fight against 
terrorism is the first and overriding priority of the Department of Justice”). 
7 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-90.100, available 
at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/ foia_reading_room/usam/ (last visited Nov. 
26, 2004). The manual states “prosecution of national security cases will 
ordinarily be handled by the USAO in the district where venue lies . . . the 
Assistant Attorney General shall retain general supervisory authority over the 
conduct of the case from its inception until its conclusion, including appeal.” Id. 
8 For instance, an AUSA may gather witnesses through offers of leniency 
or through compulsion orders requiring witnesses to testify. 
9 For example, an AUSA may now request roving wiretaps (that include 
multiple phones or communication devices) or delayed notification warrants, 
and can also use greater surveillance records. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. 
L. No. 107-56,115 Stat. 272 (2001). See also PATRIOT Act at Work, supra note 
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at least in one instance, that such increased investigatory and 
prosecutorial powers may involve too much responsibility to 
adequately supervise. 
The story of the “Detroit sleeper cell” provides an example of 
the misuse of prosecutorial powers in a terrorism case. In June 
2003, Karim Koubriti and Abdel Ilah El Maroudi were found 
guilty of conspiring to provide material support and resources to 
terrorism efforts.10 Then-acting Attorney General John Ashcroft 
stated that the convictions were a victory and that “every victory in 
the courtroom brings us closer to our ultimate goal of victory in the 
war on terrorism.”11 Soon after, the defendants, in their motion to 
set aside the verdict and for a new trial, alleged that the 
Government suppressed evidence, knowingly used false testimony, 
and improperly vouched for and bolstered the testimony of 
witnesses.12 During a hearing on the motion, Judge Rosen 
discovered that the prosecution did withhold exculpatory and 
impeachment material and thus ordered the Government to conduct 
a review to determine whether there were additional suppressed 
documents.13 On September 2, 2004, the DOJ issued a sixty-page 
report on the prosecutorial misconduct of Richard Convertino, the 
AUSA who spearheaded the prosecution. The DOJ report also 
recommended that the court dismiss the terrorism charges against 
Karim Koubriti and Abdel Ilah El Maroudi without prejudice.14 
                                                          
6. 
10 Another co-defendant, Ahmed Hannan, was found guilty of conspiracy 
to commit immigration document fraud. Barry Tarlow, Rico Report: Terrorism 
Prosecution Implodes: The Detroit ‘Sleeper Cell’ Case, 29 CHAMPION 61, 68 
(2005). 
11 Ashcroft on Detroit Terror Case, supra note 1. 
12 See Bennett L. Gershman, How Juries Get it Wrong—Anatomy of the 
Detroit Terror Case, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 327, 338-39 (2005) (detailing the 
events leading up to the dismissal of terrorism charges). 
13 See id. 
14 The government investigation was the result of a post-trial court order 
issued after government lawyers in the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Detroit brought 
evidence to the attention of defense counsel. See United States v. Koubriti, 336 
F. Supp. 2d 676, 678-81 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (dismissing the terrorism-related 
charges in Count I of the indictment because of “pervasive” prosecutorial 
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After a nine-month investigation, the DOJ report concluded 
that the “prosecution failed to disclose matters, which viewed 
collectively, were ‘material’ to the defense.”15 The DOJ 
memorandum addressed the many missteps in the prosecution’s 
disclosure and the prosecution’s misrepresentation of the facts.16 
The DOJ report, however, failed to explain how one prosecutor 
was permitted to argue fault-ridden theories in such a highly-
publicized case. 
Later investigations by the New York Times uncovered the 
DOJ’s complicit nature in the wrongful handling of the Detroit 
case.17 Convertino may have been a rogue lawyer in part, but 
according to an internal memorandum, the DOJ knew that the 
evidence was weak to begin with and charged the men with “the 
hope that the case might get better.”18 Furthermore, senior DOJ 
officials believed that Convertino was withholding information 
from the DOJ, but the only effort made to rectify the matter was to 
“rein” Convertino in.19 Nonetheless, these attempts at departmental 
oversight of Convertino failed.20 
In the post-9/11 world, there are two major elements 
contributing to the increase in terrorism prosecutions. The first 
element is the government’s goal of obtaining terrorism 
                                                          
misconduct). The terrorism-related charges were dismissed based on findings 
resulting from the post-trial investigations of both the Department of Justice and 
the court. Id. at 681. The court reviewed documents, both classified and 
unclassified, before dismissing the conviction. Id. 
15 Government’s Consolidated Response Concurring in the Defendant’s 
Motions for a New Trial and Government’s Motion to Dismiss Count One 
Without Prejudice and Memorandum of Law in Support Thereof, at 3, United 
States v. Koubriti, No. 01-CR-80778 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 31, 2004). 
16 Id. 
17 Danny Hakim & Eric Lichtblau, Trial & Errors: The Detroit Terror 
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2004, at A1. 
18 Id. (quoting Barry Sabin, the DOJ’s counterterrorism chief). 
19 Id. “Senior Justice Department officials said in interviews that they did 
not believe Mr. Convertino was sharing important information with them . . . 
[o]ne official said Washington had directed supervisors in Detroit to ‘rein him 
in’ before the trial started.” Id. 
20 See id. 
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convictions to demonstrate its ability to achieve results in the war 
on terror.21 The second element, which is also a tool of the first, is 
the PATRIOT Act’s broadened definition of terrorism.22 Federal 
prosecutors may now criminally charge those who provide material 
support to terrorists.23 This not only includes those who harbor 
terrorists, but also individuals who supply technical support such 
as expert advice and false documentation.24 These political 
elements of the nation’s fight against terrorism create a heightened 
incentive to prosecute terror suspects, thus leading to a greater risk 
of improper conduct on the part of prosecutors. 
With the many terrorism cases that lie ahead, it is time to 
reevaluate prosecutorial accountability.25 Notwithstanding many 
                                                          
21 Terrorism cases may also increase in light of the government’s new 
strategy of charging “enemy combatants” such as Jose Padilla. See Padilla v. 
Hanft, 432 F.3d 582, 584-85 (4th Cir. 2005). Beginning in May 2002, the 
government held American citizen Jose Padilla as an enemy combatant. He was 
detained on such charges as taking up arms against the United States in 
Afghanistan and conspiring to perform domestic terrorism. In February 2005, 
the District Court for South Carolina decided Padilla’s habeas corpus petition. 
Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 678 (D.S.C. 2005). The district court held that the 
government could not indefinitely detain an American citizen without charging 
him with a crime. Id. at 692. The Fourth Circuit reversed shortly after, and 
Padilla petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 
386, 397 (4th Cir. 2005). In an attempt to short circuit a Supreme Court review 
of the issue, the government requested the transfer of Padilla to civilian 
authorities so that he may be prosecuted for alleged offenses that were different 
from those offenses he was militarily held for. See Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 
582, 583-84 (4th Cir. 2005). The government also requested the withdrawal of 
the Fourth Circuit decision reversing the district court. Id. The Fourth Circuit 
denied the government’s request. Id. The Supreme Court granted the transfer, 
but will still consider Padilla’s petition for certiorari. Hanft v. Padilla, No. 
05A578, 2006 WL 14310 (Jan. 4, 2006). 
22 USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
23 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2005). The statute prohibits any person from 
providing “currency . . . lodging, training, safehouses, false documentation or 
identification, . . . weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, . . . and 
other physical assets, except medicine or religious materials.” Id. 
24 Id. 
25 See Trac: FBI, “FBI Criminal Referrals for Prosecution Declining,” 
http://trac.syr.edu/tracfbi/latest/current/. Since 9/11, while general criminal 
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generations of laws governing prosecutorial conduct, the current 
system for oversight is insufficient. Federal prosecutorial conduct 
is regulated by the U.S. Constitution, civil liability, the McDade 
Amendment of 1998,26 the DOJ United States Attorneys’ Manual 
and the DOJ’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR). Yet, 
these safeguards are insufficient to prevent misconduct in terrorism 
cases that invoke the mantra of national security. 
Part I of this Note details the federal prosecutor’s role in the 
war on terror.  Part II examines current judicial and statutory 
restraints on federal prosecutorial conduct and discusses 
professional standards.27 Part III details the shortcomings of those 
restraints, which are especially troublesome given the deference 
prosecutors are granted in terrorism cases. The lack of attorney 
sanctions by the DOJ’s Office of Professional Responsibility will 
also be discussed. Part IV will urge a reformulation of OPR 
standards and a reconsideration of the Federal Prosecutors Ethics 
Act (proposed in 1999) as a foundation for reform, and suggest that 
substantial and public sanctions may be appropriate to ensure 
accountability.28 
I. FEDERAL PROSECUTORS & THE WAR ON TERROR 
Since the end of 2001, the top strategic goal of the DOJ has 
been to “protect America against the threat of terrorism.”29 Under 
the auspices of the Attorney General, the FBI and DOJ have 
increasingly focused on the investigation of terrorist activity and 
the prosecution of terrorism suspects.30 The ninety-four United 
                                                          
enforcement actions have declined, criminal matters classified as terrorism, anti-
terrorism and internal security were up from 390 in fiscal year 2001 to 2,534 in 
fiscal year 2003. Id. 
26 Citizens Protection Act (McDade Amendment), 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2004) 
(subjecting AUSAs to a state’s attorney ethics guidelines). 
27 Professional restraints include the American Bar Association’s Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct and the DOJ U.S. Attorneys’ Manual. 
28 Federal Prosecutor Ethics Act, S. 250, 106th Cong. (1999). 
29 2003 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP., § 1.2-1.3A, available at http://www. 
usdoj.gov/ag/annualreports/ ar2003/p2sg1.htm. 
30 Id. 
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States Attorneys’ offices, with approximately 5000 attorneys, have 
a large role in the DOJ’s anti-terrorism strategy.31 The offices “are 
part of a national network that coordinates the dissemination of 
information and the development of a preventive, investigative, 
and prosecutorial strategy among federal law enforcement 
agencies, primary state and local police forces, and other 
appropriate state agencies in each of the ninety-four federal 
judicial districts.”32  
The increased emphasis on terrorism prosecution is highlighted 
by disclosed DOJ statistics. In 2003, the FBI investigated 23,785 
terrorist cases, more than double the number investigated in 
2001.33 This increase correlates to the increase in terrorism and 
terrorism-related convictions between 2001 and 2003. In 2001, the 
DOJ reported just twenty-nine convictions for terrorism and 
terrorism-related activity, whereas in 2003 the number swelled to 
103 convictions for terrorism and 558 convictions for terrorism-
related activity.34 Furthermore, according to DOJ fiscal year 
forecasts, the Department expects to increase the number of hours 
and amount of money spent on preventing terrorism and protecting 
America.35 
United States Attorneys’ Offices are faced with increasing 
pressure to demonstrate achievements in prosecuting terror cases.36 
In accordance with the Government Performance and Results Act 
(GPRA), the DOJ must set goals and objectives in order to 
measure performance.37 For the fiscal year 2005, the DOJ’s first 
                                                          
31 Initiatives Report, supra note 5, at 3. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. Terrorism convictions include “offenses involving acts (including 
threats or conspiracies to engage in such acts) that are violent or dangerous to 
human life and that appear motivated by an intent to coerce, intimidate, or 
retaliate against a government or civilian population.” Terrorism-related 
activities include “terrorism-related hoaxes and terrorist financing.” Id. 
35 Initiatives Report, supra note 5, at 28-29. The majority of the 2005 
budget ($1.5 billion) will be applied to “enforc[ing] federal laws and 
represent[ing] the rights and interests of the American people.” Id. at 28. 
36 Id. at 4-5. 
37 Government Performance and Results Act, 5 U.S.C.S. § 306 (2004); 
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strategic goal was to prevent terrorism and promote the nation’s 
security.38 Thus, emphasis is on indicators that measure any 
progress towards accomplishing this goal. 
The DOJ has developed performance measures for U.S. 
Attorneys in particular, and the Executive Office of United States 
Attorneys (EOUSA)39 is working towards implementing tools to 
measure individual U.S. Attorneys’ Offices.40 For instance, in the 
fiscal year 2005 congressional budget submission, the DOJ 
included the percentage of cases favorably resolved.41 With respect 
to the goal of protecting America against the threat of terrorism, 
this specifically means the number of terrorism-related 
convictions.42 Although the theory of such results-oriented 
performance-based measurements is to promote efficiency, 
productivity, and accountability, a potential byproduct of requiring 
such measurements is to encourage prosecutions despite possible 
weakness in the evidence. This is a serious consequence because a 
prosecutor’s obligation as a “minister of justice” rests on his or her 
ability to weigh evidence to ensure that it is sufficient to warrant 
prosecution.43 
                                                          
Initiatives Report, supra note 5, at 1 (noting that the GPRA requires agencies to 
establish goals, measure performance, and report accomplishments annually). 
38 Initiatives Report, supra note 5, at 1. 
39 Executive Office for United States Attorneys Home Page, http://www. 
usdoj.gov/usao/eousa (noting that the Executive Office of the United States 
Attorneys was created on April 6, 1953 as a liaison between DOJ and the ninety-
four U.S. Attorneys’ Offices nationwide) (last visited Jan. 22, 2006). 
40 Initiatives Report, supra note 5, at 5. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 31. 
43 Green, supra note 3, at 1587-88. See also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT, R. 3.8(f) cmt. 1 (2004); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of 
Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 
45, 51-52 (1991). The result of improper prosecutions in terrorism cases is even 
more worrisome when one considers that juries are likely to be swayed towards 
conviction if the defendant is charged with a crime that implicates a serious 
national security risk. 
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II.  CURRENT OVERSIGHT 
Since 2001, there has been a change in culture at the DOJ that 
has trickled down to the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices. The pressure to 
prosecute terrorism cases and the greater prosecutorial discretion 
tests the safeguards against prosecutorial misconduct. In order to 
critically assess those safeguards, this section will briefly review 
the judicial, statutory, and professional standards that protect 
against misconduct. 
A. Judicial Constraints 
There are several courtroom constraints on the prosecutor’s 
conduct. First, federal courts may compensate defendants for any 
due process violations on the part of the prosecutor: judges may 
suppress evidence, censure prosecutors or dismiss indictments or 
trials. Second, federal defendants who are subjected to 
prosecutorial misconduct may have a cause of action for a civil 
claim. Claims alleging a constitutional rights violation may be 
brought against a state prosecutor under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or 
corresponding Bivens claims against federal prosecutors; however, 
prosecutors acting within their prosecutorial duties may be immune 
from such liability in whole or in part.44 Third, a claim can be 
brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).45 Lastly, the 
Hyde Amendment,46 a federal statute, allows for awards of 
attorneys’ fees when there is a finding of prosecutorial misconduct. 
During a trial, due process concerns may protect defendants 
against prosecutorial misconduct. For instance, courts may 
disadvantage a prosecutor who fails to disclose exculpatory 
                                                          
44 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2004). A Bivens claim is a suit “brought directly under 
the Constitution against federal officials.” Id. (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 
U.S. 478, 504 (1978)). 
45 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (2005). 
46 Department of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary, and Related 
Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 619, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519 
(1997) (reprinted in 18 U.S.C § 3006, historical and statutory notes) [hereinafter 
Hyde Amendment]. 
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evidence, uses false evidence, or makes improper arguments.47 The 
suppression of exculpatory evidence or the use of perjured 
testimony by a prosecutor may lead to a dismissal of an indictment 
or a new trial.48 Findings of egregious prosecutorial misconduct 
could warrant overturning a conviction.49 Furthermore, the 
“relational paradigm” between prosecutors and judges deters 
misconduct.50 Prosecutors who repeatedly appear before the same 
judges have a reputation to uphold, and thus the threat of 
reputational sanctions act to ensure that prosecutors adhere to due 
process.51 But aside from prejudicing the government’s case 
against the wronged defendant or informally rebuking the 
prosecutor, a prosecutor who acts improperly is unlikely to be 
                                                          
47 See Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 
N.C. L. REV. 721, 732 (2001) (referencing the areas in which prosecutorial 
misconduct does occur). 
48 See United States v. Koubriti, 336 F. Supp. 2d 676, 682 (E.D. Mich. 
2004); Levin v. Clark, 408 F.2d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (mandating a new trial 
because prosecutor withheld evidence that could have raised a reasonable doubt 
for the jury). Under the exclusionary rule, incriminating evidence obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment’s search and seizure clause may be excluded 
from trial. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(h); United States v. 
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974) (stating that the exclusionary rule is used 
to deter unlawful police conduct but that it is not a constitutional right and thus 
the rule will only apply to evidence that may incriminate the victim of the 
search). 
49 In a racketeering case involving 175 counts of criminal activity and 
thirty-five defendants, the convictions were overturned when the judges learned 
that the prosecutor had not disclosed exculpatory material. JIM MCGEE & BRIAN 
DUFFY, MAIN JUSTICE 219 (1996). The Chief U.S. District Court judge in 
Chicago, Marvin Aspen, stated that he regretted overturning the convictions 
because of the “misguided zeal” of a prosecutor who was “willing to abandon 
fundamental notions of due process of law and deviate from acceptable 
standards of prosecutorial conduct.” Id. 
50 Peter Margulies, Above Contempt?: Regulating Government 
Overreaching in Terrorism Cases, 34 SW. U. L. REV. 449, 461 (2005) 
“Individual line prosecutors appear on an ongoing basis before federal district 
judges. They must act in a way that preserves their credibility and reputation if 
they hope to secure the district judge’s good will in a range of determinations 
such as detention hearings, evidentiary rulings, and sentencing.” Id. 
51 Id. at 459-62. 
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directly liable to the defendant unless the defendant brings a proper 
civil suit against the prosecutor. 
Defendants have a statutory right to bring suits against 
prosecutors for constitutional violations. Under Title 42 U.S.C. § 
1983, every person who acts under state law to deprive another of 
“any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution 
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit 
in equity or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .”52 Although 
this statute appears to afford wronged defendants a right to redress 
for prosecutorial misconduct, the statute is applied narrowly to 
prosecutors because of prosecutors’ unique role in the criminal 
justice system. 
To effectively maintain the criminal justice system, it is 
necessary to provide both state and federal prosecutors a certain 
degree of immunity from civil actions.53 Without immunity, the 
constant threat of personal liability could temper a prosecutor’s 
effectiveness in seeking justice.54 Furthermore, a prosecutor could 
suffer from a deluge of frivolous misconduct claims, imposing 
“unique and intolerable burdens,” upon an honest prosecutor.55 
The leading case regarding prosecutorial immunity is Imbler v. 
Pachtman.56 In Imbler, the Supreme Court held that a state 
                                                          
52 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This section works “in harmony with general 
principles of tort immunities and defenses.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 
418 (1976). 
53 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424. 
54 Id. at 424-25. 
55 Id. at 425-26 (referring to the duty of state prosecutors). 
56 Id. at 409. Paul Imbler was convicted of murder, but was later granted 
habeas relief because of the prosecutor’s use of false testimony and suppression 
of evidence on the part of the police. Imbler sued the prosecutor under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 but despite the grant of the writ of habeas relief—which recognized the 
prosecutor’s misconduct—the Supreme Court held that prosecutors must have 
absolute immunity in order to ensure the proper function of the criminal justice 
system. Id. at 415-16, 426. The Court defined the difference between “absolute 
immunity” and “qualified immunity” as follows: “[a]n absolute immunity 
defeats a suit at the outset, so long as the official’s actions were within the scope 
of the immunity. The fate of an official with qualified immunity depends upon 
the circumstances and motivation of his actions, as established by the evidence 
at trial.” Id. at 419 n.13. 
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prosecutor is absolutely immune from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 if the acts are within the scope of his prosecutorial duties—
specifically, conduct related to seeking prosecution and presenting 
the case.57 The Court reasoned that “attaining the [criminal justice] 
system’s goal of accurately determining guilt or innocence requires 
that both the prosecution and the defense have wide discretion in 
the conduct of the trial and the presentation of evidence.”58 The 
Court further stated that the potential for personal liability may 
influence a prosecutor’s decision to introduce relatively 
questionable witnesses or evidence, thus limiting the trier-of-fact’s 
ability to weigh all the evidence in determining guilt or 
innocence.59 The Court, however, recognized that such immunity 
leaves the defendant without “civil redress against a prosecutor 
whose malicious or dishonest action deprives him of liberty,” but 
the Court reasoned that the defendant’s right to a fair trial is 
protected by the “remedial powers of the trial judge, appellate 
review, and state and federal post-conviction collateral 
remedies.”60 Additionally, the Court emphasized that the public is 
not left powerless because a prosecutor may be criminally 
punished for willful deprivations of constitutional rights under 18 
U.S.C. § 242 or disciplined by a bar association.61 Yet, as will be 
                                                          
57 See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976). See also Burns v. 
Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991) (upholding prosecutor’s immunity from liability for 
conduct in probable-cause hearing but asserting partial immunity with respect to 
giving legal advice to police officers during investigations). Although Imbler 
and Burns address § 1983 claims brought against state prosecutors, the same 
analysis is used to determine the liability of a federal prosecutor under a Bivens 
claim. Moore v. Valder, 65 F.3d 189, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519 
U.S. 820 (1996). 
58 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 426. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 427. 
61 Id. at 429. See also 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2005). The statute provides for 
criminal punishment for willful deprivation or violation of Constitutional rights 
or federal law under color of law. It does not provide a private right of action. 
For the most part, this statute is used to punish police brutality. See, e.g., Screws 
v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 
(1951). In United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 (1997), the Supreme Court 
held that the defendant should only be criminally prosecuted if he had “fair 
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discussed in Part III, such protections may be ineffective, 
especially in cases involving national security. 
The Supreme Court further developed the doctrine of 
prosecutorial immunity in Burns v. Reed.62 In Burns, the Court 
distinguished advocatory duties from investigatory duties and 
refused to extend absolute immunity to the latter.63 The Court 
specifically held that giving legal advice to the police prior to the 
initiation of a prosecution was not an activity protected by absolute 
immunity.64 The Court has defined investigatory activities as those 
usually performed by a detective or police officer that occur prior 
to the establishment of probable cause for arrest.65 Advocatory 
activities, on the other hand, are related to the “initiation of a 
prosecution, the presentation of the state’s case in court, or actions 
preparatory for these functions.”66 
A defendant may also sue the United States as sovereign under 
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The FTCA provides that the 
United States may be held liable, with exceptions, for the negligent 
or wrongful acts of government employees.67 The FTCA has a 
“discretionary function exception” granting immunity to 
                                                          
warning” that his conduct violated a constitutionally protected right. The “fair 
warning test” is similar to the “qualified immunity test” used in civil actions in 
which liability attaches only if “‘[t]he contours of the right [violated are] 
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is 
doing violates that right.’” Id. at 270 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 
635, 640 (1987)). If this interpretation is applied to prosecutorial misconduct 
during the trial phase, it can be argued that the prosecutor would have no fair 
warning that he would be criminally liable under § 242. The utilization of § 242 
as a way to discipline prosecutorial misconduct during trial may not be a 
realistic protection. 
62 500 U.S. 478, 496 (1991). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273-75 (1993); Moore v. Valder, 
65 F.3d 189, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1995); 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2004) (holding that the 
United States may be liable because the federal prosecutor used inappropriate 
investigative techniques when he intimidated and coerced witnesses). 
66 Buckley, 509 U.S. at 278. 
67 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (2005). 
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prosecutors performing advocatory duties;68 qualified immunity 
only applies when the prosecutor’s conduct goes beyond these 
duties.69 Acts such as “deciding whether to prosecute, assessing a 
witness’s credibility to ensure that he is giving an accurate and 
complete account of what he knows, identifying the evidence to 
submit to the grand jury and determining whether information is 
‘exculpatory’ and ‘material’” have been defined as discretionary 
and thus fall within the exception to liability.70 Thus, there is a 
similar analysis for determining whether the United States will be 
liable under the FTCA for the wrongdoing of a prosecutor and 
whether a prosecutor will be civilly liable under § 1983 or a Bivens 
action, namely, when the prosecutor is performing advocatory 
duties there is absolute immunity, and when he or she is 
performing investigative duties, qualified immunity applies. 
The 1997 Hyde Amendment is another possible mechanism for 
redressing victims of prosecutorial misconduct.71 Under the 
Amendment, Congress enables a federal court to award reasonable 
attorneys’ fees and costs to an acquitted defendant “where the 
court finds that the position of the United States was vexatious, 
frivolous, or in bad faith, unless such circumstances make such an 
award unjust.”72 Few parties have met this bar. The DOJ’s Office 
of Professional Responsibility (OPR) reviews claims brought 
under the Hyde Amendment. Between 1997 and 2000, there were 
95 claims filed under the statute.73 Defendants prevailed in two 
cases and settled in two cases.74 
In addition to potential civil liability for constitutional 
                                                          
68 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2005). 
69 Moore, 65 F.3d at 217. 
70 Id. at 197. 
71 Hyde Amendment, supra note 46. 
72 Id. 
73 U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., FOLLOW-UP INFORMATION ON THE OPERATIONS 
OF THE DEP’T OF JUSTICE’S OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 41 (2001) 
[hereinafter GAO FOLLOW-UP ON OPR], available at 
http:www.gao.gov/new.items/d01135r.pdf. “According to OPR officials, OPR 
reviews every claim filed under the Hyde Amendment to determine if any facts 
or issues arising from Hyde-related matters warrant inquiry by OPR.” Id. at 41. 
74 Id. 
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violations, federal prosecutors may be disciplined for violations of 
professional standards set forth by state bar associations and 
internal standards of the DOJ. The OPR oversees the professional 
conduct of federal prosecutors and investigates allegations of 
misconduct. 
B. McDade Amendment and Professional Standards 
Analysis of the statutory professional standards for federal 
prosecutors begins with the McDade Amendment of 1998.75 The 
McDade Amendment subjects U.S. Attorneys to state laws and 
rules and local federal court rules regarding professional 
standards.76 The movement towards the McDade Amendment 
dates back to a controversy over a 1989 memorandum from then-
Attorney General Richard Thornburgh.77 The memorandum was 
issued in response to the Second Circuit case of United States v. 
Hammad.78 The AUSA investigating a Medicaid and mail fraud 
case against the Hammad brothers directed an informant to meet 
with the suspect to gather evidence. The court held that because the 
Hammads had already retained counsel, and because the informant 
was acting as the alter-ego of the prosecutor, the prosecutor 
violated an American Bar Association Disciplinary Rule, which 
states that an attorney may not contact a person represented by 
counsel without the knowledge and permission of that person’s 
counsel.79 
                                                          
75 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2004). 
76 Id. (providing that “[a]n attorney for the Government shall be subject to 
the State laws and rules, and local Federal court rules, governing attorneys in 
each State where such attorney engages in that attorney’s duties, to the same 
extent and in the same manner as other attorneys in that State”). A majority of 
states have adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See generally 
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2004). 
77 Memorandum from Att’y Gen. Richard Thornburgh to all Dep’t of Just. 
Litigators (June 8, 1989), quoted in In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 486-90 
(D.N.M. 1992) [hereinafter Thornburgh Memorandum]. 
78 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988). 
79 Id. at 840. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESP. DR7-104(A)(1) (1983). DR 7-
104 states: “During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not: 
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The DOJ feared that following the decision in United States v. 
Hammad,80 the Second Circuit’s extension of the “no contacts” 
rule to pre-indictment criminal investigations would hamper 
undercover investigations.81 The Attorney General disseminated a 
memorandum stating that neither DR 7-104 nor the ABA’s parallel 
Model Rule prohibited “contact with a represented individual in 
the course of authorized law enforcement activity.”82 Further, the 
memorandum stated that the DOJ would resist on Supremacy 
Clause grounds any disciplinary action against federal prosecutors 
by state authorities pertaining to this issue.83 
Former Attorney General Janet Reno, Thornburgh’s successor, 
issued a formal regulation that codified the Thornburgh 
memorandum.84 The regulation was viewed as an attempt by the 
DOJ to preempt the field of attorney discipline.85 The ABA 
                                                          
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the 
representation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter 
unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other party or is 
authorized by law to do so.” Id. Compare with MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 4.2 (1983) “In representing a client, a lawyer shall not 
communicate about the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer 
knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has 
the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so.” Id. 
80 Hammad, 858 F.2d at 834. 
81 See Note, Federal Prosecutors, State Ethics Regulation, and the McDade 
Amendment, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2080, 2083-84 (2000). But see Hammad, 858 
F.2d at 840 (rejecting a bright-line rule regarding the application of the no 
contacts rule to pre-indictment investigations and limiting its holding to the facts 
of the case). 
82 Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 77. 
83 Federal Prosecutors, State Ethics Regulation, and the McDade 
Amendment, supra note 81, at 2084-85 (citing In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 483, 
489 (D.N.M. 1992)). 
84 See 28 C.F.R. § 77 (1999). The regulation gave the DOJ greater authority 
over the rules regulating its attorneys. Id. 
85 See Roberta K. Flowers, A Code of Their Own: Updating the Ethics 
Codes to Include the Non-Adversarial Roles of Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C. L. 
REV. 923, 961-62 (1996) (noting that the DOJ allowed for public comments 
regarding the proposed regulation and that those comments addressed the 
dubiousness of DOJ authority to create special rules for prosecutors). 
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Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility 
issued an opinion addressing the new regulation.86 The opinion 
stated: 
[W]hen an agency promulgates regulations purporting to 
authorize conduct in derogation of other law, those 
regulations must be grounded in a statute which 
contemplates regulations of the kind issued. A general 
grant of regulatory authority to an agency is not sufficient 
to support the issuance of regulations that permit what 
other law forbids.87 
Courts also reacted negatively to the DOJ’s mandate.88 In 
United States v. McDonnell Douglas Corporation, investigative 
agents of the DOJ made ex parte contact with present and former 
lower-level employees of McDonnell Douglas Corporation without 
the consent of the corporation’s counsel.89 In response to a 
McDonnell Douglas motion, the district court ordered a protective 
order barring such ex parte contacts because they violated the 
Supreme Court of Missouri’s no-contact rule.90 The Eighth Circuit 
affirmed; the court found no statutory authority for the DOJ’s 
creation of a rule that exempted federal prosecutors from local 
ethics rules.91 The court held the regulation invalid and without 
federal preemption power. 
In addition to the local and state ethics rules, prosecutors must 
also abide by internal guidelines established by the DOJ and 
                                                          
86 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 
(1995). 
87 Id. 
88 See United States ex rel. O’Keefe v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 132 F.3d 
1252, 1257 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that ex parte contacts by the federal 
prosecutors were barred by Missouri Supreme Court Rule 4-4.2 and that 28 
C.F.R. § 77 (repealed 1999) was invalid and thus without power to supercede 
the local rule). See also United States v. Ferrara, 847 F. Supp. 964, 969 (D.D.C. 
1993) (stating that the Thornburgh memorandum was merely the “unilateral 
statement of Justice Department policy by the Attorney General”). 
89 132 F.3d at 1253. 
90 Id. The Supreme Court of Missouri’s ethical rules have been adopted by 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. Id. 
91 Id. at 1257. 
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enforced by the OPR. The United States Attorneys’ Manual 
(Attorneys’ Manual) dictates the policies, procedures and standards 
of conduct for prosecutors.92 The Attorneys’ Manual offers 
guidelines for discretionary decisions such as initiating federal 
criminal prosecutions,93 communicating with represented parties,94 
and declining criminal prosecutions.95 The Attorney’s Manual 
provides only internal guidelines and does not affect prosecutors’ 
immunity defenses to suit because it makes clear that it does not 
“create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by 
any party in any matter civil or criminal.”96 
With respect to prosecutorial misconduct, § 1-4.100 of the 
Attorney’s Manual mandates that department employees should 
report any “non-frivolous allegation of misconduct” to the 
“appropriate supervisor.”97 The supervisor “shall evaluate whether 
the misconduct at issue is serious” and if so, shall report the 
allegation to the OPR and to legal counsel in the Executive Office 
of United States Attorneys (EOUSA).98 This framework 
establishes three levels of assessment: the complaining employee 
must determine the seriousness of possible misconduct by a co-
worker, the supervisor then assesses the seriousness of the conduct, 
and finally the OPR and EOUSA investigate the allegations.99 
Statements by a judge that allege prosecutorial misconduct are 
also subjected to a hierarchical internal review.100 First, department 
attorneys are required to report to their supervisors “any statements 
by a judge or magistrate indicating a belief that misconduct by a 
Department employee has occurred, or taking under submission a 
claim of misconduct.”101 Second, the supervisor is to report to the 
                                                          
92 U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, supra note 7, at § 1-4.100. 
93 Id. at § 9-2.030. 
94 Id. at § 9-13.200. 
95 Id. at § 9-2.020. 
96 Id. at § 1.1.00. 
97 Id. at §1-4.100. 
98 U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, supra note 7, at § 1-4.100. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at § 1-4.120 
101 Id. at § 1-4.210. 
LU MACROED.DOC 4/18/2006  12:41 PM 
 PROECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN TERROR CASES 395 
 
OPR any “evidence or non-frivolous allegation of serious 
misconduct.”102 
The OPR is responsible for reviewing and investigating 
allegations of professional misconduct or violations of internal 
guidelines by a federal prosecutor.103 First, the OPR will 
commence an inquiry to determine if the allegation is credible by 
speaking with the attorney in question.104 Second, the OPR will 
determine which inquiries are worth investigating further and 
assign an Assistant Counsel who will conduct interviews of the 
attorney, the complainant and any other witnesses.105 Lastly, the 
Assistant Counsel prepares a report of the findings and 
characterizes any prosecutorial misconduct into two levels: 
intentional misconduct or reckless disregard of professional 
obligations.106 A recommendation of a range of disciplinary action 
                                                          
102 Id. (emphasis added). 
103 See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, DEP’T OF JUST.: INFO. ON OFFICE OF 
PROF’L RESP.’S OPERATIONS (2000) [hereinafter GAO INFO ON OPR]. See also 
Ellen S. Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing “Discretionary 
Justice,” 13 CORNELL J.L & PUB. POL’Y 167, 186 (2004). The former chief 
counsel of the OPR, Michael Shaheen, once stated, “We believe that we are the 
only component in the department that is the ultimate check on behalf of the 
Attorney General against prosecutors and misconduct by them . . . and abusing 
the machinery that they have at their disposal, which is awesome.” MCGEE & 
DUFFY, supra note 49 (quoting Shaheen). 
104 GAO INFO ON OPR, supra note 103, at 6-7. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 12. 
An attorney engages in intentional misconduct when (1) the attorney 
acts with the purpose of violating an obligation imposed by law, 
applicable rule of professional conduct, or department policy or 
regulation or (2) acts knowing that the natural and probable 
consequences of his or her action is to violate the obligation. An 
attorney acts in reckless disregard of an obligation when the attorney 
(1) knows or should know of the obligation, (2) knows or should know 
that his or her conduct involves a substantial likelihood that the 
obligation will be violated, and (3) nonetheless engages in the conduct, 
which is objectively unreasonable under the circumstances. 
Id. 
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is also prepared.107 The head of the attorney’s office enforces the 
disciplinary actions recommended by the OPR.108 If for any reason 
the head of the office wishes to deviate from the OPR’s 
recommendations, he or she must request approval from the 
Deputy Attorney General.109 
When misconduct is found to be intentional, the state bar 
where the attorney is admitted is notified.110 Between 1997 and 
March 2000, forty of the forty-nine cases of prosecutorial 
misconduct were reported to a state bar association.111 During that 
same period, the OPR received 3913 complaints.112 
Rather than finding professional misconduct, the OPR may 
find that the attorney used “poor judgment.”113 A poor judgment 
finding does not result in OPR disciplinary action; however, the 
matter may be referred to the head of the office where the attorney 
works to determine if in-house disciplinary measures are 
appropriate.114 
III. DEFICIENCY OF CURRENT OVERSIGHT 
A. Heightened Due Process Concerns and Greater Power and 
Discretion for AUSAs 
Terrorism cases, which involve national security, confidential 
information, and publicity, produce a different dynamic for the 
prosecutor and the judge as overseer. First, due process protections 
                                                          
107 Id. at 7. 
108 Id. at 12. 
109 GAO INFO ON OPR, supra note 103, at 12. 
110 Id. at 13. 
111 Id. at 8. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. An attorney exercises poor judgment when, “faced with alternative 
courses of actions, the attorney chooses a course of action that is in marked 
contrast to the action that the department may reasonably expect an attorney 
exercising good judgment to take.” Id. 
114 GAO INFO ON OPR, supra note 103, at 13. 
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during trial are tempered by the high stakes involved. Second, the 
extrinsic pressures on line-prosecutors to successfully prosecute 
these cases may encourage improper conduct. Third, the tools used 
in terrorism cases, particularly the Classified Information 
Procedures Act,115 the Special Administrative Measures statutes116 
and the Freedom of Information Act,117 lessen the judge’s and the 
defense attorneys’ abilities to oversee prosecutorial conduct and 
assail attorney-client privilege. 
In terrorism cases, which involve matters of national security, 
judicial oversight may be limited.118 Judges are likely to be 
deferential to the government’s position when determining a due 
process violation.119 Additionally, with limited disclosure of 
evidence, certain types of abuse may be particularly worrisome, 
such as: abuse of prosecutorial discretion in indictment, 
misrepresentations to the court, improper remarks to the grand jury 
or during trial, and failure to comply with federal requirements 
regarding the discovery and disclosure of evidence.120 
                                                          
115 18 U.S.C.S. app. 1-16 (2005). 
116 Prevention of Acts of Violence & Terrorism, 28 C.F.R. § 501.3 (2004); 
National Security Cases, 28 C.F.R. § 501.2 (2004). 
117 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2002). 
118 Contrary to the theory that the judiciary usually applies deference to the 
government position, Attorney General John Ashcroft, in a speech to the 
Federalist Society, noted that “intrusive judicial oversight and second-guessing 
of presidential determinations” are putting national security at risk in this “time 
of war.” Dan Eggen, Ashcroft Decries Court Rulings; Second-Guessing Bush on 
Security Raises Risk, He Says, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 2004, at A06. 
119 Peter Marguiles, Judging Terror in the “Zone of Twilight”: Exigency, 
Institutional Equity, and Procedure After September 11, 84 B.U. L. REV. 383, 
399-402 (2004). See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 279, 283 (4th Cir. 2002) 
(2004) (holding that the district court should have applied deference to the 
government’s security interests when the district court allowed Hamdi’s habeas 
petition which questioned his status as enemy combatant) rev’d. 542 U.S. 507 
(2004). See generally Heidee Stoller, et al, Developments in Law and Policy: 
The Costs of Post 9-11 National Security Strategy, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
197, 224-33 (2004). 
120 See generally Peter Margulies, Above Contempt?: Regulating 
Government Overreaching in Terrorism Cases, 34 SW. U. L. REV. 449, 469-84 
(2005). 
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Furthermore, the external pressures involved in terrorism cases 
may lead a prosecutor to disregard the threat of reputational 
sanctions.121 Top level officials at the DOJ, in particular former 
Attorney General Ashcroft and Attorney General Gonzales, have 
pursued terrorism cases with a particular public zeal. A prosecutor 
may choose to subvert professional and ethical rules to win his or 
her case out of fear that losing would not only be a loss in the 
courtroom but a loss in thwarting terrorism generally. 
The Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA)122 
diminishes oversight of prosecutorial conduct because it limits 
access to the government’s evidence and witnesses.123 Under 
CIPA, the government may move the court to redact classified 
material from potentially discoverable documents or to “substitute 
either a statement admitting relevant facts that the classified 
information would tend to prove or a summary of the 
information.”124 As a result, the prosecution’s evidence can largely 
go un-reviewed by the court and defense counsel. Without such 
review, an important safeguard against misrepresentations of 
evidence by the prosecutor is debilitated.125 The beyond-a-
reasonable doubt standard “arguably suffice[s] to protect the 
innocent,”126 but where the evidence is largely comprised of 
classified materials, there can be an unusual reliance on the 
prosecutor’s statements and presentation of the facts which limits 
the defense counsel’s ability to present a proper defense.127 
In an ongoing terrorism case, United States v. Aref & Hossein, 
                                                          
121 Id. at 465-69. See supra Part II.A. 
122 18 U.S.C.S. app. 3 §§ 1-16 (2005). 
123 See Cameron Stracher, Eyes Tied Shut: Litigating For Access Under 
CIPA in the Government’s “War on Terror,” 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 173, 185 
(2004). 
124 Id. at 184. 
125 See Zacharias, supra note 43, at 51-52 (“[The adversarial system allows] 
attorneys to keep an eye on one another and on the judge to make sure that they 
all perform their assigned roles in proper and ethical fashion.”). 
126 Id. at 57. 
127 See Hanft v. Padilla, 432 F.3d 582, 586 (4th Cir. 2005) (alluding to 
possible misrepresentations by the government in its arguments for maintaining 
Padilla’s “enemy combatant” status). 
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the prosecution invoked CIPA to prevent the release of certain 
classified information.128 Originally, the prosecution proposed 
limited defense access to classified information and only under the 
supervision of a DOJ security employee serving under the Court.129 
The judge later held that the defense counsel would have access to 
the classified information at any time, but only in certain secured 
areas. The court also held that the DOJ security employee would 
be prohibited from listening to defense counsels’ conversations and 
from reporting to the prosecution which materials defense counsel 
viewed.130 Furthermore, the judge required the prosecution to 
present, in an in camera hearing, the classified information and the 
“security significance . . . so the court could balance the 
defendants’ right to access the material against the Government’s 
interest in non-disclosure.” 131 Although the judge in this case did 
recognize that the proposed CIPA request should be limited, the 
element of deference to the government’s assessment of the 
security significance is likely to remain in future terrorism cases.132 
                                                          
128 No. 04-CR-402 (N.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 9, 2004). The two defendants are 
charged with attempting to launder money for terrorism, providing material 
support to a foreign terrorist organization, and importing firearms without a 
license. Media sources revealed that a key document, allegedly linking 
defendants to terrorists in Iraq, was mistranslated. Brendan Lyons, Extension 
Denied in FBI Sting Case, ALB. TIMES UNION, Jan. 15, 2005, at B4. 
129 John Caher, Defense Attorneys Get Wide Access in Terrorism Case, 
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 18, 2004, at col. 6. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. See generally Ralph V. Seep, Annotation, Validity and Construction 
of Classified Information Procedures Act, 103 A.L.R. FED. 219, § 2(b) (2006) 
“[C]ourts have applied a three step analysis: (1) an inquiry as to whether the 
evidence is relevant; (2) if the evidence is relevant, a determination whether it is 
material; and (3) a balancing of the defendant’s need for access to the 
information in the preparation of his defense against the government’s need to 
keep the information from disclosure by reason of its potential harm to national 
security interests.” Id. 
132 See United States v. Moussaoui, 65 Fed. Appx. 881, 887 n.5 (4th Cir. 
2003) “Intervenors maintain that we need not defer to the classification 
decisions of the Government. Implicit in this assertion is a request for us to 
review, and perhaps reject, classification decisions made by the executive 
branch. This we decline to do.” Id. 
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In terrorism cases, the adversarial system, an element in 
ensuring a defendant’s due process rights, is vulnerable.133 This 
threat is apparent when the government requests “Special 
Administrative Measures” (SAMs) for a federal prisoner.134 SAMs 
impose specific conditions and restrictions on a prisoner.135 There 
can be limits on prisoner communications when “there is a 
substantial risk that a prisoner’s communications or contacts with 
persons could result in death or serious bodily injury to 
persons . . . .”136 These limits on communication can apply to 
interactions between a defendant and his counsel, thus impinging 
on the attorney-client privilege and harmfully affecting the 
adversarial system.137 
In United States v. Reid, SAMs were imposed to restrict Reid’s 
attorney-client privilege.138 The SAMs limited communication 
between Reid, pre-cleared defense counsel and defense counsel 
staff and third parties.139 Part of the SAMs Restriction Document 
required the defense counsel to sign an affirmation acknowledging 
receipt of the document.140 Reid’s attorneys informed the 
government that they would not sign the affirmation and the 
government promptly cut off communication between defense 
                                                          
133 See id.   
134 Prevention of Acts of Violence & Terrorism, 28 C.F.R. § 501.3 (2004); 
National Security Cases, 28 C.F.R. § 501.2 (2004). SAMs may be implemented 
when it is reasonably necessary to “prevent disclosure of classified information 
upon receiving written certification to the Attorney General by the head of a 
member agency of the United States intelligence community that the 
unauthorized disclosure of such information would pose a threat to the national 
security and that there is a danger that the inmate will disclose such 
information.” Id. 
135 28 C.F.R §§ 501.2, 501.3. 
136 28 C.F.R § 501.3. 
137 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d). See generally Marjorie Cohen, The Evisceration 
of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Wake of September 11, 2001, 71 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1233 (2003). 
138 214 F. Supp. 2d 84 (D. Mass. 2002). Richard Reid later pled guilty to 
eight offenses. See U.S. v. Reid, 369 F.3d 619, 620 (1st Cir. 2004). 
139 See Reid, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 87-88. 
140 See id. at 88. 
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counsel and Reid.141 To diffuse the conflict between the defense 
counsel and the prosecutors, the court held that the SAMs 
affirmation was not required of defense counsel.142 The court, after 
highlighting the importance of adversarial proceedings, stated that 
the affirmation imposed “as a condition of the free exercise of 
Reid’s Sixth Amendment right to consult with his attorneys 
fundamentally and impermissibly intrudes on the proper role of 
defense counsel.”143 
Although the court in Reid attempted to protect 
communications between the defendant and his counsel, the power 
of SAMs and the required attorney affirmations may go unfettered 
in other courts. This is particularly worrisome because restrictions 
on communication between defense counsel and clients result in 
the sacrifice of a proper defense.144 The court in Reid also noted 
that affirmations may have a “chilling effect” on defense attorneys 
in terrorism cases.145 The court pointed to the case in which 
defense attorney Lynne Stewart was charged with violating the 
affirmation she had signed when she communicated statements 
from her imprisoned client to the press.146 After the Lynne Stewart 
conviction, defense attorneys may be tempered in their advocatory 
pursuit by the looming threat of criminal liability for violations of 
an affirmation agreement. 
Furthermore, the fact that defense counsel has limited 
communication with his client may influence the behavior of the 
prosecutor. For instance, under the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, the prosecutor is required to “make timely disclosure to 
the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor 
that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the 
offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense 
and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known 
                                                          
141 See id. 
142 See id. at 91. 
143 Id. at 94. 
144 See U.S. v. Reid, 214 F. Supp. 2d 84, 94 (D. Mass. 2002). 
145 Id. at 95. 
146 Id. See United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348, 369-70 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003). 
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to the prosecutor . . . .”147 But where a prosecutor knows that it is 
unlikely defense counsel will be made aware of exculpatory 
evidence, the prosecutor may be tempted to not adhere strictly to 
the rule. 
Relevant information pertaining to a defendant’s case may also 
be curtailed by recent restrictions on the Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA).148 The objective of FOIA is “to pierce the veil of 
administrative secrecy and to open agency action to the light of 
public scrutiny.”149 However, under Attorney General John 
Ashcroft, a stricter policy of disclosure was implemented.150 The 
new policy changed discretionary disclosures: agencies would 
have to consider national security, effective law enforcement, and 
personal privacy before using its discretion to disclose 
information.151 
Not only is less information voluntarily disclosed due to the 
new policy, but courts have upheld government claims of 
exceptions to FOIA when there is a request for information 
regarding terrorist suspects.152 Thus, where the government might 
                                                          
147 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 3.8(d) (2003). 
148 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2002). See Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Stud. v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Just., 331 F.3d 918, 928 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1041 (2004) 
(holding that the information requested by plaintiffs with respect to detainees 
after 9/11 was exempt from FOIA because the records were compiled for 
ongoing law enforcement purposes). The circuit court stated, “in the FOIA 
context, we have consistently deferred to executive affidavits predicting harm to 
the national security, and have found it unwise to undertake searching judicial 
review.” Id. at 927. 
149 Rose v. Dep’t of Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 263 (1974). 
150 The Attorney General usually issues a policy regarding FOIA at the 
beginning of a new administration. Former Attorney General John Ashcroft 
issued a memorandum on October 12, 2001, roughly a month after 9/11, 
replacing former Attorney General Janet Reno’s 1993 FOIA memorandum and 
her policy of “presumption of disclosure.” U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., FREEDOM OF 
INFO. ACT: AGENCY VIEWS ON CHANGES RESULTING FROM NEW ADMIN. POL’Y 
GAO-03-981, at 1 (2003). 
151 There are nine categories of exemptions to FOIA; however, agencies 
may disclose information even if the information could be exempted. Ashcroft’s 
policy was to limit this agency discretion. Id. 
152 See Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Stud., 331 F.3d at 928; ACLU vs. U.S. Dep’t of 
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normally be compelled by judicial decree to disclose such 
information in response to a FOIA request, in terrorism cases, 
broader interpretation of FOIA exemptions have sufficiently 
thwarted parties’ attempts to discover information that could be 
useful to a proper defense. 
For example, in Center for National Security Studies v. United 
States Department of Justice, the government invoked the law 
enforcement exemptions contained in FOIA to bar disclosure of 
the names of post-September 11 investigation detainees and their 
attorneys and details of the detention/arrest and charges.153 The law 
enforcement exemption provides that information may be withheld 
if it is “compiled for law enforcement purposes.”154 The court 
applied a deferential review of the DOJ’s claim of law enforcement 
purpose and held that the terrorism investigation was one of the 
DOJ’s “chief ‘law enforcement duties’ at this time.” 155 
In summary, the limitations on information and restrictions on 
the defense attorneys’ access to their clients and potential 
witnesses compromise the process of building a coherent, well-
organized and successful defense. Furthermore, the impartial party 
overseeing the adversarial process may also be uninformed.156 
Without a defensive counterbalance and a well-informed judicial 
overseer, the due process protections against prosecutorial 
transgressions are largely defeated. 
B. Statutory Guidelines 
In addition to the assault on traditional judicial safeguards 
against due process violations in terrorism cases, the statutory 
framework of the McDade Amendment157 does not enhance the  
                                                          
Just., 321 F. Supp. 2d 24, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
153 331 F.3d at 922, 928. 
154 Exemptions 7(A), 7(C), and 7(F). 
155 Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Stud.,  331 F.3d at 926. 
156 See United States v. Koubriti, 336 F. Supp. 2d 676, 678-81 (E.D. Mich. 
2004). 
157 Citizens Protection Act (McDade Amendment), 28 U.S.C. § 530B 
(2004). 
LU MACROED.DOC 4/18/2006  12:41 PM 
404 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
 
protection of a defendant’s rights. Although the Amendment was 
enacted with the intention of preventing prosecutorial misconduct, 
its application has met much criticism.158 The Amendment does 
not adequately reflect the uniqueness of the federal prosecutor’s 
role.159 The statute requires that prosecutors abide by “state laws 
and rules, and local Federal court rules, governing attorneys in 
each State where such attorney engages in that attorney’s 
duties . . . .”160 Yet, confusion arises when the state rules conflict 
with the federal rules of procedure.161 Pursuant to the McDade 
Amendment, a prosecutor may be disciplined if he or she follows a 
federal rule of procedure that conflicts with a state ethics rule.162 
The statute offers no substantive guidance for a prosecutor who 
practices in multiple jurisdictions, it is rarely enforced, and when 
applied, courts have construed it in an inconsistent manner. 
The statute also subjects the prosecutor to state laws and rules 
of all the states in which he or she performs attorney duties.163 
When assigned to federal cases that involve investigations across 
several states, it would be difficult for a prosecutor to abide by the 
numerous and conflicting state ethics laws and rules.164 The DOJ 
                                                          
158 See Paula J. Casey, Regulating Federal Prosecutors: Why McDade 
Should be Repealed, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 395 (2002); Federal Prosecutors, 
State Ethics Regulations, and the McDade Amendment, supra note 81. The bill 
had weak support initially but it finally passed with little debate as part of a 
larger omnibus spending bill. 
159 See generally Ryan E. Mick, Note, The Federal Prosecutors Ethics Act: 
Solution or Revolution?, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1251 (2001). Mick’s note addresses 
the general ethical guidelines and the responsibilities of prosecutors. It also 
recommends the proposed Federal Prosecutors Ethics Act (FPEA) over the 
McDade Amendment. 
160 28 U.S.C.§ 530(B). 
161 Federal Prosecutors, State Ethics Regulation, and the McDade 
Amendment, supra note 81 at 2089 (noting specifically states such as Oregon 
and Florida that have adopted a no-contact rule, that bars contact between law 
enforcement agents and suspects, and the resulting impediment on the federal 
prosecutorial power to use cooperating witnesses, wiretaps and undercover 
agents). 
162 Id. 
163 28 U.S.C. § 530(B). 
164 Federal Prosecutors, State Ethics Regulation, and the McDade 
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attempted to resolve possible confusion by defining the phrase 
“‘where such attorney engages in that attorney’s duties’ to mean 
either (1) if a case is pending, the rules of ethical conduct adopted 
by the court before which the case is pending or (2) if there is no 
case pending, the rules of ethical conduct that would be applied by 
the attorney’s state of licensure.”165 This interpretation does not 
eliminate the problem that arises when the court ethics rules 
conflict with the state ethics rules because the statutory text of the 
McDade Amendment does not support the DOJ’s interpretation.166 
Thus, following McDonnell Douglas, in which the Eighth Circuit 
held that DOJ rules do not have federal preemption power, the 
DOJ’s interpretation is not likely to be binding on a court 
addressing this issue.167 
Furthermore, the amendment may be applied inconsistently. In 
United States v. Colorado Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit held 
that the McDade Amendment applied to state ethical or 
professional rules, but not to procedural or substantive rules that 
conflict with federal law.168 The determination, however, between 
                                                          
Amendment, supra note 81 at 2092-93. Prior to the Amendment, prosecutors 
were required to abide by the rules of the jurisdiction of the litigation. Id. 
165 GAO INFO ON OPR, supra note 103, at 18. 
166 See 28 U.S.C. § 530(b); United States ex rel. O’Keefe v. McDonnell 
Douglas Corp., 132 F.3d 1252, 1256 (8th Cir. 1998). The Attorney General does 
not have the express or implied “authority to exempt lawyers representing the 
United States from local rules of ethics which bind all other lawyers appearing 
in that court of the United States.” Id. 
167 See, McDonnell Douglas Corp., 132 F.3d at 1257. 
168 189 F.3d 1281 (10th Cir. 1999). See United States v. Lowery, 166 F.3d 
1119, 1124-25 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating that even if prosecutors violated a 
Florida state rule of professional conduct, such conduct would not warrant 
suppression of the resulting evidence because federal evidentiary law and not 
state law determines admissibility of evidence); Stern v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the 
Dist. of Mass., 214 F.3d 4, 20 (1st Cir. 2000) “The potential for conflict between 
state and federal law therefore should have been obvious, but section 530B does 
not speak to the issue. Instead, Congress directed the Attorney General to fill out 
the details of enforcement by regulation . . . These regulations dispel the notion 
that section 530B grants states and lower federal courts the power, in the guise 
of regulating ethics, to impose strictures that are inconsistent with federal law.” 
Id. 
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procedural and professional rules is not straightforward.169 The 
Court looked to four factors in determining whether a rule is one of 
ethical conduct.170 The factors are: (1) whether the professional 
conduct is generally recognized by “consensus within the 
profession as appropriate;” (2) whether the rule comes in a broad 
commandment form; (3) whether the rule is broad and vague in 
nature (if so, it is likely to be a rule of ethics because procedural 
and substantive laws must be specific); and (4) whether the rule is 
directed at the attorney herself and whether members of the 
profession “would agree that the violating attorney ought to be 
held personally accountable.”171 After applying these factors, the 
Court held that a Colorado Rule of Professional Conduct 
restricting a prosecutor’s ability to subpoena a lawyer to present 
evidence about a past or present client was an ethical rule, and thus 
the McDade Amendment would apply and the prosecutor would be 
subject to the local rule.172 
Enforcement of the Amendment is thereby weakened due to 
the confusion created in its application. Despite the McDade 
Amendment’s potential for sanctions, in the handful of cases that 
exist, courts have not sanctioned the prosecutors; instead opting for 
such remedies as reporting the misconduct to the state bar 
association for disciplinary proceedings, reporting the incident to 
the OPR, or specifically ameliorating the effect of the misconduct 
on the case before the court.173 
Lastly, the McDade Amendment is not a forceful means of 
regulating prosecutorial misconduct because it is rarely enforced 
                                                          
169 See Colo. Sup. Ct., 189 F.3d at 1287-88. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 1288-89. 
173 See U.S. v. Bowman, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1243 (N.D. Ala. 2003); 
United States v. Grass, 239 F. Supp. 2d 535, 549 (M.D. Penn. 2003) (holding 
that suppression of evidence because of possible violation of Pennsylvania’s no-
contact rule was not an appropriate remedy in the case and that an alternative 
remedy would be to file a complaint with the state disciplinary board); United 
States v. Lowery, 166 F.3d 1119, 1124 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that any 
violation of state bar rules could not provide a basis for a federal court to 
suppress testimony that was otherwise admissible). 
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by state bar associations or by the OPR. Although individual state 
bars may hold undisclosed disciplinary hearings on McDade 
violations, there are few publicly disclosed violations.174 The OPR 
should comply with the McDade Amendment and it does have a 
process for determining violations,175 but the OPR does not 
maintain information on the number of times the OPR encountered 
conflicting ethical rules in its investigations, nor does it report the 
frequency of misconduct findings in those instances.176 The lack of 
internal OPR information highlights a deficiency in application of 
the amendment. 
C.  The War on Terror Raises Concerns About the DOJ’s 
Internal Disciplinary System 
The DOJ United States Attorneys’ Manual and the internal 
rules of the OPR do not encourage maximum accountability on the 
part of federal prosecutors. First, there is a cumbersome reporting 
process. Second, OPR investigations rarely result in actual findings 
of misconduct that warrant more than a mere verbal censure. 
Lastly, when the misconduct does reach a level in which sanctions 
other than censure would be appropriate, such as dismissal or 
suspension, the OPR does not impose or oversee the punishment, 
but relies instead on the individual attorneys’ offices or state bar 
associations. 
1. Internal Inefficiency in Supervision 
The hierarchical structure, although a necessary system, is 
encumbered by bureaucracy. For instance, according to the DOJ 
                                                          
174 See GAO INFO ON OPR, supra note 103, at 18. 
175 The OPR applies state bar rules when investigating possible cases of 
prosecutorial misconduct. GAO FOLLOW-UP ON OPR , supra note 73, at 5. For 
example, if an attorney is handling a case in Virginia but is a member of the 
Ohio bar, the OPR will assess which of the two states has the most stringent 
laws. Id. Thus, once a misconduct investigation is opened, the prosecutor will be 
subject to the more stringent laws. Id. 
176 Id. 
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rules with respect to allegations of prosecutorial misconduct during 
judicial proceedings, the supervisor must investigate the 
prosecutor’s behavior to determine if there is evidence of 
misconduct and whether the misconduct is serious enough to report 
to the OPR.177 By the time a serious allegation is brought to the 
attention of the OPR, it will take up to a year for an OPR 
investigation and action.178 This delay leaves the defendant with an 
appeal as the only alternative. 
In terrorism cases especially, this multi-layer method of 
internal attorney supervision is vulnerable to political 
grandstanding and inter-office rivalries.179 The national importance 
of terrorism cases can make them very attractive to the media, 
which increases the pressure felt by the office to be successful. 
Thus, in terrorism cases with the potential of high publicity, due 
process and conservatism are often subverted by a keen desire to 
win a conviction.180 In addition to internal department demands, 
strong external political pressure, and a prosecutor’s own 
competitive nature, may influence whether a prosecutor closely 
adheres to professional and ethical rules. 
The Detroit terror case demonstrates the deficiency of such 
                                                          
177 U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, supra note 7, at § 1-4.120. Additionally, 
between 1997 and 2000, DOJ employees reported misconduct less each year—
the number of reports declined from 42% of all complaints in 1997 to 25%. 
GAO INFO ON OPR, supra note 103, at 9. 
178 Id. at 10-11. 
179 There are 94 separate U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, each headed by a 
president-appointed U.S. Attorney. Although the offices are all under the 
direction of the Attorney General, the U.S. Attorneys serve the different 
communities to which they are appointed. Thus, there is an inherent 
disjointedness and a “degree of tension will always exist between the local and 
national mandates of U.S. Attorneys.” Initiatives Report, supra note 5, at 13-14. 
180 See Hakim & Lichtblau, supra note 17. See also MCGEE & DUFFY, 
supra note 49, at 210 (noting that “new administrations seeking to remedy a 
social ill or win favor with voters could and did commandeer the Justice 
Department’s authority in ways that put constitutional rights in jeopardy”). 
McGee and Duffy detail the DOJ’s “War on Crime”—specifically the drug war 
of the 1990s—and the increasing pressure on federal prosecutors to get results. 
Id. 
LU MACROED.DOC 4/18/2006  12:41 PM 
 PROECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN TERROR CASES 409 
 
internal oversight.181 During the case, at the highest departmental 
level, Attorney General John Ashcroft demonstrated a intense 
interest in prosecuting this case.182 Additionally, the Washington 
counter-terrorism supervisors were willing to prosecute the weak 
case and were fully aware that there was a possibility the 
prosecutor in charge was not disclosing evidence.183 At the 
immediate level, Convertino’s direct supervisor in the Detroit 
office, Keith Corbett, did not rein in Convertino as directed by the 
Washington office.184 The lack of supervision by Corbett was 
perhaps reactionary: in an email to another top prosecutor, Corbett 
stated, “[i]n the 25 years that I have worked for the Department of 
Justice, I have never seen anything approaching this level of 
micromanagement.”185 It appears that politics and egos fueled the 
prosecution which may have led to the mismanagement of the case 
and the three-year imprisonment of Mr. Koubriti, one of the four 
immigrants accused.186 
2. Lack of a Formalized Disciplinary Process 
According to the DOJ’s 2003 annual report, the OPR “seeks to 
assure Congress, the courts, the state bars and the public generally 
that Department attorneys . . . comply with obligations and 
standards imposed by law, applicable rules of professional 
conduct, or Department regulations or policy.”187 Failures to 
                                                          
181 See Hakim & Lictbau, supra note 17. 
182 See United States v. Koubriti, 305 F. Supp. 2d 723, 765 (E.D. Mich. 
2003) (admonishing Attorney General Ashcroft for public statements to the 
press regarding the case in violation of professional rules of conduct and a court 
order prohibiting public disclosure of information). 
183 See Hakim & Lichtblau, supra note 17. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. (quoting e-mail from Corbett to Collins). The New York Times 
obtained a departmental review of the Detroit office that stated there was an “us 
versus them” attitude between Corbett and Joseph Capone, the senior terrorism 
prosecutor from Washington. 
186 Danny Hakim, Defendant is Released in Detroit Terror Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 13, 2004, at A16. 
187 Att’y Gen., FY 2003: Performance and Accountability Report 1 (2003), 
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comply with these standards and rules would result in “appropriate 
discipline” and referral to state bars.188 According to the one 
statistic offered by the DOJ, in 2003, there were ninety-eight 
investigations completed; only thirteen resulted in findings of 
misconduct.189 There is no information about the disciplinary 
process of the thirteen cases because the OPR refers such 
misconduct to the individual’s particular Attorneys’ Office.190 
Although the OPR supposedly “seeks to assure” the public that 
DOJ employees are accountable to rules and laws, the OPR’s track 
record of enforcement is lackluster. Between 1997 and 2000, there 
were sixty cases in which the OPR found no attorney misconduct 
despite serious judicial criticism or findings of misconduct.191 
Furthermore, the OPR does not track attorneys who resign or retire 
as a result of an OPR investigation.192 Although the OPR may 
continue to investigate attorneys who retire, no disciplinary actions 
could be imposed.193 
Because OPR refers cases of prosecutorial abuse to individual 
United States Attorneys’ Offices, there is an inconsistency in 
punishments.194 Although the OPR gives punishment 
recommendations to each prosecutor’s supervisor, from records 
disclosed between 1997 and 2000, supervisors have consistently 
                                                          
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/annualreports/ar2003/p2sg1. htm. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. Before 2001, there were regular, thorough reports by the OPR. This 
level of disclosure ended with the 2000 annual report. 
190 See id. 
191 GAO FOLLOW-UP ON OPR, supra note 73, at 6. Although the OPR had 
originally reported sixty cases in which it found no misconduct despite judicial 
findings, it reviewed these cases and determined that in eighteen of those cases, 
the OPR did criticize the attorneys’ conduct. Id. at 7. 
192 Id. at 3. OPR officials state that it would be impossible to show a cause-
and-effect relationship between a pending investigation and an attorney’s 
resignation. Id. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. at 2 “Administrative disciplinary actions that can be taken when 
professional misconduct is found can range from oral reprimand to termination 
of employment, depending on the circumstances of each case, such as the nature 
and severity of the offense and the experience level of the subject attorney.” Id. 
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opted to give the minimum punishment recommended.195 
OPR’s policy of referring cases of intentional prosecutorial 
misconduct is also questionable. As of March 2000, there were 
several closed cases dating back to as far as 1996 where the OPR 
had not yet informed the appropriate state bar.196 
3. Nondisclosure of Attorney Misconduct 
Findings of prosecutorial misconduct are often not disclosed in 
the attorney’s files.197 If there was an official personnel action, 
such as suspension or removal, a form documenting the action 
would be permanently placed in the attorney’s folder.198 
Otherwise, a written reprimand is placed in the folder for a period 
not to exceed three years and the “retention period begins the day 
that the reprimand is delivered to the employee, even if it is not 
actually filed in the official personnel folder until later.”199 More 
importantly, the reprimand is to be removed from the official 
personnel folder when the employee leaves the DOJ.200 The OPR 
has a confidentiality policy regarding information that it has 
received and maintains about DOJ attorneys.201 Thus, it is possible 
                                                          
195 See id. at 17, 22. For example, the recommendation for Brady violations 
was oral admonishment to written reprimand. In two separate cases, both 
prosecutors received only an oral admonishment. Id. Oral admonishments do not 
become a part of the attorney’s personnel file, whereas written reprimands do 
become a part of the file. Id. 
196 GAO FOLLOW-UP ON OPR, supra note 73, at 9. Specifically, the OPR 
records state that, with respect to certain cases of intentional misconduct, “OPR 
intends to refer the matter to the appropriate state bar in the form of a public 
summary once the summary has been reviewed and approved within Justice’s 
prescribed review process.” Id. 
197 Id. at 2-3. The attorney’s personnel folder is governed by Office of 
Personnel Management (OPM) regulations. Id. 
198 Id. at 3 (known as a Standard Form 50). 
199 Id. 
200 Id. Copies of the reprimand may be maintained for both statistical 
purposes and to support more “serious discipline for later offenses.” Id. 
201 28 C.F.R. § 0.39b (2005). This regulation states, “[T]he Counsel and the 
internal inspection unit shall maintain the confidentiality of the employee or 
applicant unless the employee or applicant consents to the release of his or her 
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for a prosecutor to leave the U.S. Attorney’s Office and still 
practice law without record of his past misconduct.202 
Additionally, records of attorneys’ conduct and investigations 
by the OPR may be exempt from requests for information under 
the Freedom of Information Act.203 In Jefferson v. Department of 
Justice, the plaintiff, a federal prisoner, brought a FOIA suit 
against the OPR seeking records regarding his prosecuting 
attorney, AUSA Jeffrey Downing.204 Jefferson had accused 
Downing of prosecutorial misconduct but the OPR found no basis 
for any action.205 Jefferson requested “all records created and/or 
received by OPR” with respect to Downing.206 The OPR responded 
that it “‘is the policy of the Office when responding to FOIA 
requests from third-party individuals to refuse to confirm or deny 
the existence of records concerning Department of Justice 
employees, absent their consent or ‘an overriding public 
interest.’”207 
When Jefferson brought suit, the government refused 
disclosure of the AUSA’s records by invoking one of FOIA’s law 
enforcement exemptions, Exemption 7(C).208 Exemption 7(C) 
applies to “records or information compiled for law enforcement 
purposes” that “could reasonably be expected to constitute an 
                                                          
identity or the Counsel determines that the disclosure of the identity is necessary 
to resolve the allegation.” Id. 
202 See id. Only the most flagrant cases of misconduct require actual 
suspension or removal, thus it should be mandatory that such findings remain in 
the personnel record so that future employers are made aware of potential 
professional unfitness. 
203 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2), (6) (2002). See Jefferson v. Dep’t of Justice, 
Office of Prof’l Responsibility, 284 F.3d 172, 179 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that 
although the law enforcement record exemption of FOIA would protect certain 
records from disclosure, the government does not have a blanket exemption). 
204 284 F.3d. at 174. 
205 Id. at 175. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. 
208 Jefferson, 284 F.3d at 175. There are nine exemptions to the FOIA. 5 
U.S.C. § 552(b) (2002). 
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unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”209 The court in 
Jefferson held that the government could not claim a blanket 
exemption and remanded the case back to the trial court for 
findings as to whether the non-disclosed documents did in fact fall 
under the law enforcement exemption.210 The court held that 
records received “in connection with government oversight of the 
performance of duties by its employees” do not fall within the law 
enforcement exception.211 OPR files that could lead to civil or 
criminal sanctions, however, would fall within this exception.212 
Under Jefferson, if the OPR has compiled information 
regarding violations of only internal DOJ guidelines, the 
information would be subject to a FOIA disclosure.213 Yet, this 
standard may be considered overly broad because where there is a 
violation of a DOJ guideline, there is often a violation of a 
corresponding court rule or state ethics rule, which could lead to 
civil or criminal liability. Therefore, the OPR could claim that such 
files were not only compiled for internal sanction purposes, but to 
effectuate state or court laws or the McDade Amendment.214 
Furthermore, there is another bar to disclosure: once it can be 
determined that certain files are not for law enforcement purposes, 
there must be an analysis of whether the “public interest in 
disclosure of any law enforcement records was outweighed by [the 
prosecutor’s] privacy interests.”215 
                                                          
209 5 U.S.C. § 522(b)(7)(c) (2002). 
210 Jefferson v. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Prof’l Responsibility, 284 F.3d 
172, 179 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
211 Id. at 178-79 (quoting Weisberg v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 489 
F.2d 1195, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973)). 
212 Id. at 284 F.3d at 177. 
213 See id. Courts have found that failure to comply with internal guidelines 
of an agency do not give rise to a cause of action. See Ellen S. Podgor, supra 
note 103, at 191-92 (citing United States v. Lee, 274, F.3d 485, 492 (8th Cir. 
2001) and Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170 (1954)). 
214 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
215 Jefferson, 284 F.3d at 178. 
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The usual safeguards that promote ethical and professional 
conduct on the part of prosecutors are undermined in terrorism 
cases. The overarching gravity of national security and the 
resulting deference to the prosecutors’ roles in terrorism cases 
makes it difficult for the judiciary, defense counsel, and external 
state bars to regulate the federal prosecutors’ conduct. This Note 
recommends greater transparency by the OPR and a stricter 
internal disciplinary process in combination with particular 
Congressional oversight in terrorism cases.216 
Improvements in OPR policy are fundamental. Judges may 
report misconduct in their opinions or directly notify the OPR. 
Judges, however, are limited by the information available to 
them.217 The OPR on the other hand, may review all the evidence 
(including grand jury testimony), speak with colleagues and 
supervisors, and question the prosecutor. The OPR has the best 
access to determine whether the prosecutor’s processes were 
legitimate with respect to indictment, discovery, contact with 
witnesses, and representations in court. 
A. The OPR 
With respect to terrorism cases, OPR should play an active 
role. The OPR’s current policy is to passively wait for complaints 
to arise.218 Additionally, the OPR will not investigate if the issue is 
still before the courts.219 This delay often results in inadequate 
                                                          
216 Although many scholars and professionals have called for a 
reformulation of how prosecutors are supervised, this section will deal primarily 
with how to prevent prosecutorial misconduct within terrorism cases. For a 
discussion of the debates surrounding supervision of federal prosecutors, see 
Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Federal Court Authority to Regulate 
Lawyers: A Practice in Search of a Theory, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1303 (2003). The 
call for transparency is not a novel recommendation. See Zacharias, supra note 
47 at 773-74. 
217 MCGEE & DUFFY, supra note 49, at 218. 
218 GAO INFO ON OPR, supra note 103, at 6. 
219 Id. 
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investigations because evidence of possible misconduct becomes 
stale.220 OPR can actively handle terrorism cases by appointing an 
OPR official to oversee these cases on a periodic basis. For 
example, when a CIPA exception is invoked, the OPR official 
would be empowered to review such a decision. 
Although this level of OPR supervision may antagonize 
prosecutors and U.S. Attorneys, it is necessary to reformulate the 
role of the OPR. OPR jurisdiction over the conduct of DOJ 
attorneys should be presupposed. A culture of professionalism and 
respect for ethics rules, internal guidelines, and federal statutes 
should be the norm. 
B. Congressional Oversight 
The OPR has a duty to maintain its commitment to deterring 
prosecutorial misconduct. In the past, the OPR’s commitment to 
this goal apparently “rose and fell in direct proportion to the 
personal interest an attorney general devoted to the issue.”221 
Because the commitment to deterring prosecutorial misconduct 
should not depend on the whims of a particular Attorney General, 
Congress should have oversight.222 
The Federal Prosecutors Ethics Act, proposed in January 1999 
                                                          
220 Id. Furthermore, “[a] complaint may be closed administratively if, for 
example, it . . . lacks sufficient evidence to warrant an inquiry.” Id. 
221 MCGEE & DUFFY, supra note 49 at 277. Attorney General Janet Reno 
emphasized disclosure of prosecutorial misconduct and OPR proceedings unlike 
her predecessors and successors. Id. 
222 Although critics may question whether Congress has the power for such 
oversight of United States Attorneys, Congressional oversight is essential to the 
balance of powers. Although there may be those who argue that Congressional 
oversight of DOJ attorneys would hamper the attorneys’ effectiveness in 
pursuing justice, Congressional oversight would protect against threats to civil 
liberties. As the DOJ continues to consolidate its powers with respect to criminal 
prosecutions—this is seen with federal sentencing and limited disclosure in 
terrorism cases—the judiciary and Congress need to be vigilant in supervision. 
The Federalist Papers clearly highlighted the threat of too much power in one 
branch: “this accumulation of powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in 
the same hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.” 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison). 
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by Senator Orrin Hatch of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 
recommended such congressional oversight.223 Two important 
elements of the Ethics Act required the Attorney General to 
“establish a range of penalties for engaging in such prohibited 
conduct, including reprimand, demotion, dismissal, suspension 
from employment, referral of ethical charges to the bar, and 
referral of evidence related to the conduct to a grand jury.” 224 The 
Attorney General would also be required to “report annually to 
specified congressional committees on the activities and operations 
of DOJ’s Office of Professional Responsibility.”225 
The Ethics Act should be reconsidered. It makes two important 
reforms that would reinforce the current judicial, statutory, and 
internal guidelines that protect against federal prosecutorial 
misconduct.226 First, as addressed above, there would be a 
formalized disciplinary process by formulating penalties for each 
type of misconduct.227 Second, the Ethics Act would increase the 
DOJ’s accountability as a whole by mandating that the Attorney 
General report annually to Congress regarding the operations of 
the OPR.228 
Congress has the expertise and the ability to oversee OPR 
investigations pertaining to possible misconduct in terrorism cases. 
                                                          
223 The Ethics Act was first proposed as an alternative to the McDade 
Amendment. As discussed in Part II.B., supra, the McDade Amendment 
subjects federal prosecutors to state ethics laws and rules. The Ethics Act, on the 
other hand, would require federal prosecutors to abide by state ethics rules only 
to the extent that the rules or laws do not conflict with the effectuation of federal 
law or policy. For instance, a major criticism of the McDade Amendment was 
that many state rules and laws bar attorneys from contacting represented 
witnesses. This no contact rule is contrary to federal law and would ultimately 
interfere with the prosecutor’s ability to efficiently investigate and prosecute a 
case. Under the Ethics Act, prosecutors would still be subject to general state 
ethics rules but with certain exceptions—such as in the case of the no contact 
rule. 
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A congressional committee with authority to review confidential 
national security documents may review the validity of the 
indictments, the evidence presented, and contact with protected 
witnesses. 
CONCLUSION 
The safeguards against prosecutorial misconduct are 
significantly weaker in terrorism cases. By invoking the 
importance of national security, the government has sought to limit 
information and judicial processes in terrorism cases. Federal 
prosecutors, who are essentially foot soldiers in terrorism cases, 
should be supervised in order to ensure fairness in terrorism 
prosecutions. For this reason, it is necessary to reevaluate the 
DOJ’s internal oversight of its attorneys and to reformulate the 
way prosecutors are sanctioned. The DOJ has historically guarded 
the ability to discipline its attorneys. Thus, external supervision by 
Congress is necessary to protect against the DOJ’s inherent bias. 
 
